International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences Cene
Editr-nClief NelJ Snelser
fo Advne StYi h Behvoa nScencs eSia[c/CA, USA,
Alir/
Pau B. Baltes
Planck Inslirute for Human Dev'elopmnent. Berlin. Germain
Volume 24
2001 ELSEVIER AMISTERDAM-PARIS-NEW YORK-OXFORD-SHANNON-SINGAPORE-TOKYO
:
I 'a/tic Pluralismt 2tr vlue Of life is greater. Clearly, value of lire estimates based on villingness to pay are considerably more reliable than in the 1980s and at growing numiber of
retical it-Cost,
values of life which are are findling makers fo decision fabl enoug eei-otaalssadrgi eliale
nouhaalyis fr beefl-cot ad rgu-
fatory impact analysis.
Questions about risk information, perception, econometric estimation, contingent valuation. and the rm tValues of life estimates remain. Risk-risk analysis rilt ar developed as an alternative to benefit-cost analysis in is the relationship The central of regulations. analysis. e year income and in disposable between changes connection elie individual mortality. Valuing life directly is avoided Stat ee Fote exmpls. clletio Grham f tuiesbyM mined and Wiener ( 1995) or the special issue of9tile Join-nat of may Risk and (Ucei fainlY in January 1997, As long as there .Ž.ti.. are concerns about the ethical propriety of valuing life dah and abýout the reliabilit\ of value of life estimats h .ib~iit incentive to des elop alte'rnatives to beniefit-cost an-alhIiand sis based ol \altie' Of lire exists Asý long as progress ,o the continues to be made ill eStima1HingU NaIties Of life. their iected use in making policy v\ ill ggross -
See also: Children. Value of: Consumer Economics: -rs cost osfr: Cost-Benefit A'la I>si%: H ealthI Economics: Health ogical Pjsk Appraisal andj Optimistic Bias: H uman Capitalmon. .irced
Educationial Aspects: Life Course- Sociological Aspects. Safety Economics of.- \Vage Differential's )etd and Structure -
ess to oped..
flife valu., nd ing
Johuanne',on M. Johainvcon P-O. Lofaren K-G 1997 Oil the value of changes in life e~pecianc% Blips %ersus paramietric chiange,. icuratalofRAA andtue ciznui'I1S. 201-19 Johanssoii P-0 1995 Etahicaing Health R'.'As. An Le-ononuc Ippronwh. Cambridge Uni'ersity Press. Cambridge. UK Jons-Le M 1,76 e Iharof Life. An Ec ononnc Anait sit. sft uvyo JOnker2si of Chicago Press. Chicago Jones-Lee M W 1985 The value of life adsft uvyo recent developments. The Genera Papers 10. 141-73 Jones-Lee M W (ed.) 1992 The I'alue of Life and S/aler. NorthHolland. New, York rlAst:Th KopRJSmtVKtes)99VaugN Rv.oenwce Dionage A~swssnwcni. Re-
Evomnoink of Natural sources for the Future. Washington. DC Linnerooth J,1982 Murdering statistical lives ? In: Jones-Lee \V'(ed,) TitiIcdueo/ Li/, anid Seifet-. North-Holland. Ne%%
York., pp 229-61
Manning W0. Keeler F B. New house J P. Sloss E M. Wasserman J'1991 The Coc';'o /Poit Hea/th Hahav. Harvard nsriy rs.CmrdeM MiMnEI9!Cs'B-t, Da,~s-In nlvccte rion. Praeger.
Ness York
L ;ni Situivi %to I aiim Public NMitchell R C.- Cai ~on RT 19x89 Col'rc T\ainCntonan DCtun ~in. eore o h Hat a nin s i i . onu fPoiia 70 si ii 3I2 N"Inii Rosen S 19891 \'niuinu health risk -Inerwvan Economic Room,
7t. 241- ,5
Sclielhng T C 1968 The life)you save nia' hc-youroun in'Chase S Bled.) Prbo,i:t: n Pub/n ELpni'urebt- .-lned1, %1% Brook ing, Inistitution. \Vashingnon. DC. pp 127-76 Sloan F A\(cd.) 1996 1a/nhing Hea/lth (art- Cambridge University% Press. Nes Y~ork Tolle\ G S Kenkel D. Fabian R ted' i 994 I alunig Hlea/tih lot it cisc rsti of Chi cago Press. eit itEonom,,: App' ... Pet/si In Chicago Vscusi V, K 1992 randi Ti nih-a//- Public aid Pinmen Ri-spnwthi/au-' I,.- Risk Osford Un" ersity Press. Neus York VmcuMm W K. V'ernon J NI.- I larringion J E 1995 CEatmnei of" lRe~eiih,'nand o Mm, IIT Pres'. Cam bridge. MA
Bibliographyv ivino tcii4~ , '1muen ou Risk, wv DiLite Bailey- M J 19W0 Re~huie oiy mrcnEncpieInuteftrPbi Baeis For Benfii. AerianEntrprse nsttue fr Pbli Pocý lessoll Research. \VaShingrn~n. DC 71. randat-Ratuf SI Braid t-Raut P\\ I 9,M) Occuipat ionalI heaIt h ethics: OS HA and d ie couirts .1jurned of litetlth , Po/ini -. Pot/ei- mid Lou 5 523 '4 CC lmus EroomejJ 978 Try ingto bsae I l~ife Aenimal at Pabl/ EenonenniGC.comus 9: 91-100 CropperM L.AydedeS K. Portncy PR 1994 Preferenice, rorlife place' Asaving progranm- Ho"k thle puiblic discounts limte and age tightof RMs and L nwqitanir 8' 243 -65 ,Journal make mae cropperM iL.Freeman -X,%1190)! En'ironnmental' health efcitc' Value Pluralism IofIn: Braden J B. Kok~tad C'D ted,.) Mal-sw nin thec Demaiund f -for ' E otn,ic,1,1,d1 Qnedaji - North-Holland. New% ) ork. pp 'Value Pluralism' has tradlitionally been understood tes of if165-221 s a metaphysical thesis about what values there W19 alues -Drmm~nn M .OliiiSodrt0i.Trac alues that cannot be Eiaiiitio'i o/ orneGW19 H/eath/i Ciore Proultimatelv are: there are many v',odMF sis of Mthods t/onthe 're Eccinonik.SodatGL 'reduced' to a single supervalue. Although value aT'nflinws. Oxford University Press. Ness York ýptiafi nionism has an impressive pedigree of proponents *and ffeeman A M 1993 71w Ah'awroe'nwt of Ent-trotiienuil and risk- - 'Osoic I lhs Theori aid Aletliod%. Resources for the (e.g., Bentham, Mill, and, arguably. Aristotle and
dFc ~euture, Washington, DC
,is the
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C19 c; nvriyPes tossir elhadkeaie.Ofr JD. Wiener J B 1995 Risk i%. RiA: Tiae/eo//.s hi
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r press, C
~hannesson
Hambiland tMAEiottnHavr'Uiest
M 1996 Tn-opt- and Meqliodc of Economiic- Erialafan~onl Of Health, Care'. Kluwer. Boston. MA
Nietzsche among others). it is nowy widely assumed to be false. The arguments for value pluralism, however, are surprisingly inconclusive. Indeed, they critically depend on the resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how%are values properly individuated? The metaphysical plurality of values has been thought to be important in two main ways. First, if values are plural. any theory that relies on value 16039
Value P/ualismn monism is mistaken. So, for example. hedonistic utilitarianism and, most forms of preference-utilitartanism must be rejected. Second. the plurality of values is thought to raise problems for rational choice. If justice. for instance. is irreducibly distinct fromt mercy. ho;; can there be rational choice between them? \Without reduction, it seems there is no common ground that justifies choosing one value over another. On closer inspection. however, it turns out that metaphysical or 'reductive' v'alue pluralism does not ha~e the implications for rational choice that man%' hia;e supposed. A charitable interpretation of value pluralist writings suggests a second. 'nonreductive..' foinin of \aue pluralism. Nonreductive pluralism is neutral on the metaphysical question of plurality but insists that in the context of choice, there are dfifferences between values-whether or not those values reduce to at Single supervalue-that have important implications for rational choice. Since the differences claimned to htold between, values \ary from author to author. nonreducti; e value pluralism is not itself at particular NieN about values but merely a convenient rubric under which atloose collection of different views about \alues nij' be grouped. This article e\amines the main arguments for reductive value pluralism, argues that reductive value pluralism does not have certain implications it ik widely thoughbt to have, and outlines three forms of nonreductive value pluralism,
evening~s pleasure is wholly constituted by the thrill at the gaming tables, what it is to have the evening's pleasure is fully explained by the thrill it is constituted by. If all values reduce to a single value, that value is the only ultimate value, and value monism, is correct. if however there is something more to two or More values than the values they- are instrumental to, constituted by. etc., then those values are irreducibly distinct, and value pluralism is correct. 2 Three A rguments lot Reductin. l'a/itt PIueim,yiii
be vulnerab there be ju' items as di sophical ins cake? Whilt instrumenta pleasure), it or respectin being valua that exhaus evaluative d given by sc could the di~ sophical ins matter of qt think that e are just a in To these is to suggest uncharitabl, what it is it about a kin happiness. I things invol happy expe Some monk. is given by 'rational' d that runs property of value of t, differences I or number, Whether value are phz be fully-in is usually uand being I might be pr atively-neut certain eval or 'rational guarantee strengthsx more valua have fully-ui Perform evi for those d, Ones. If, in evaluative c insisting th: One must gi' ValuCntrhec
Although~ there has been no agreement on which is the one value to which all others reduce. the view that there is such a value has two main attractions. If all values reduce to one. then values can be neatly systematized as instruments to. constituted by. etc., a singlec supervalue. Value mnoisnm appears to ensure a simple and elegant axiology. with a supervalue at the trunk of a structure that branches out to the other values that each derive from the supervalue in some ;vav. Moreover, if value monism holds, it seems that all conflicts between values are onlh apparent. For if there is ultimately only one value, then Options for choice can be tidily arrayed according to how much of the supeivalue they bern. promote. or respect. An\ eval* uative choice would ultimatelk be at choice between t\o amounts of the supervalue. Choosing between 1. Rediuciv'e a/ue PIm'a/isin values would always be like choosing between two lumps of coal or three. Thus. \alue monism seems to Value pluralists maintain that whatever values are, dissolve the threats to practical rationality posed by there are ultimately many of them: they do not all tragtic choices, moral dilemmas. and 'incommenstirjedche to a single ultimate value. Exactly how this abl' options. metaphysical thesis is to be understood depends on Despite these attractions, most contemporary value how the notion of reduction is to be understood. theorists assume that value pluralism is true. There are Reduction in the context of values is best underthree main arguments for pluralism. First is the stood as an explanatory relation: if one value reduces intuitive implausibility of value monism: given the to another, wvhat it is to bear the one value is fully apparent diversity of values, how could there be a explained'by what it is to bear, promote, or respect the single value 'common to' all valuable items? Second is other value. This reduction is neutral on the general the thought that akrasia can be explained only if ontological question of wvhether there 'really' are any values are plural: how can it make sense for someoflC values at all. The pluralist maintains only that there to choose soniething that she believes is worse overall are many values, whether or not they are to be unless there is something attractive about the worse right, own their in regarded as entities option that is not 'included' in the better one? A Two paradigmatic relations of explanatory reducclosely related third argument maintains that some~ wholly 'is and to' instrumental merely 'is are lion choice situations involve unavoidable' loss: no matter constituted, by.' '(Others include 'is merely symbolic which alternative one chooses, something valuablel of"). part a merel~y 'is to.' contributory of,' 'is merely will be forgone, and thus. there must be plural values if one value is merely instrumental to another, there is at stake in the choice. nothing more to having the one value than promoting the value it is a means to, For example, if beauty isvauthyc Vle not, I merely instrumental to pleasure. what it is to be M ;nists I O,'diniain hitititim, -. beautiful is fully e~plained by the pleasure it' brings. If was ii reply is there another, by constituted one value is wholly' 4 Ud1tlitarianisi Value monism seenis to run afoul of common seas nothing more to having the one value than being a way Two intuitions suggest that any nionistic account wilKOf Bentham in which the other value is borne. For example, if the ,
'
16140
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I a/ne Phnaiveisi
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be vulnerable to counterexample. First, how could
here be just one value that runs through xaluable philoitems as diverse ats. for example. achieving cheeseed' of delicious slice a eating anid insight ophiCAI 5 hl ehp hevleo ohotosi sh ae to or constituted by some value (e.g.. ir nstrumental leaure. i ishar tobeleve that bearing, promoting. re o respecting that value is ultimately all there is to their to, being valuable. Second. if there were a single value oly that exhausted, the' value of all' valuable things, the be evaluative difference between things could alwayshow supervalue. But given by some amount of the between achieving philo~~ could~ th ifrneialue cheesecake be a delicious eating 5ophical insight and mateo quantity of some one thing?It is incredible to the thik tat valati edifferences among diverse goods a matter of more or less of a single value. hat charges. monists offer two replies. The first these To all' on an ist sgest that the troublesome intuitions rely Itly hc 0nwo oim n acrigt a s tsunhrtbe bring or bear to is supervalue the hear to is what it Tea about a kind of feeling or experience like pleasure or the happiness it N.indeed, hard to believe that all1 Valuable her things Involve ha;mlng oi producing a pleasurable or Mie al'happy experience. But mnoisi~n need' not be so crude. al Some nmonists propose in~tead that the ultimate value isgiven by the satisfaction of one's 'fully-informied' or Iere -rational' desires or preferences. The one property lice that runc thirough1 all \aluable itenms. then. is the. the property of satisi' ing, constrained desires, anid it is the ;'al' value of thatl thati is the SUpervalue. Evaluative 'een differences between items are a matter of the strength een or number of desires the\ satisfy. two Whether desire-satisfaction accounts of the superisto value are plausible depends on wvhat it, is for a desire to Jby be 'fully-informied' or 'rational.* 'Full-informiation' .surisusually understood as 'ha;%Ing all the relevant facts and being, free from logical error.' ' Rational* desires alue are igh beprocedurally rational (passing certain evalutests) or substantively rational (passing the certain evaluative tests). Insofar as 'till-informiatioi¶' the or 'rational' I.%a value-neutral' constraint, there is no be a guarantee that such constrained desires or their nd is strengths will track what is intuitively valuable or if lv more valuable: it is perfectly possible that everyone cone have fully-informed or procedurally rational desires to erall Perform evil and malicious deeds, and that the desires ,'orse for those deeds be strongel' than desires for angelic 2? A ones. If. in an effort to secure this tracking. one places ,onlC evaluative constraints on desires, as one might do by ,atter inlsisting that desires be substantively rational. thenr .iable values that' operate one must give up monism. For the alues as constraints on desires must be distinct from the value they constrain, and so there are ultimately many values, not one. Monists have a Second, more promising. reply. This reply was introduced by Mill' in an effort to defend Utilitarianism against counterintuitive consequences sense. Of Bentham's quantitative hedonism. There are, Mill it will
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but insisted, not only, different quan iih'.s of pleasure. philoof pleasure The different quatIhiie.s of pleasure. sophical insight is a 'higher' pleasure than thre pleasure' of eating delicious cheesecake. Thus, while there is ultimately only one value, there are different qualities of it that explain the seeming diversity of values. Moreover, the evaluative differences between valuable ofatheg amont t nsome items are no scivigpimplyogivenlby andeatn nih supervalue; civn hlspia cheesecake may differ in the qualii *r of the supervau they bear or instantiate-one pleasure is 'higher.' This reply gets to the heart of the dispute between monists and pluralists. The monist insists that the a common-sense belief in multiple values isofin,a fact single aspects or qualities belief about different value. Whether' this position is plausible' depends on tomke two how values are, to be indiiutd asWha considerations two distinct values~ opposedttw qualities or aspects of a single value? Unfortunately. this question has received almost no philosophical attention. Until thre question of how \alues are to be individuated is settled. ordinar\ intuitions cannot provide good reasons fo] thinkingr %~alue pluralism INtrue. 22Akiwi.ah Some philosophers (Wiggins 1978. Nussbaunm 1986)at have argued that for akrasia to be explained as coherent phenomenon. plural values ai e required. and since titans/a is aIcoherent phenomenon. it follows that there are plural valtues. This ar~gtlment is often' piesented as establishing the 'incommenstirability' or values, but 'incommne~nsurabilitY' is used as synonvmous with or as entailing pltiralit%. Ifoie-judgpes that one has most reason to choose one alternative but instead chooses the other. one is weak of wvill. Suppose one ms hoebtengiat party, and staying home to wvoi k. Although one believes that staying hiomec to work has the greatel value-and therefor~e that one has most reason to stay homie-one chooses to go to the party,. Ho\\ can suchl a choice be explained'? If monism is coriect. it seems that N~eakness of will must be an incoherent phenomnenon. For suppose that there is a single ultimate value. say, pleasure. It seems. then, that there is nothing about the lesser option that could possibly attract one to it. For everything the lesser option has going for included in laueKi tacranaonto plus more it-X for going has option what the greater home for stay to choose cannot One boot. to pleasure a reason, no matter how bad, for there is no reason for choosing the one option that is not already a reason for choosing the other. The argument. however, does not succeed in establishing value pluralism. For akratic choice can be explained simply by attributing to the akrates a beligi' that there are plural values atý stake: there need not 16141
V'alue Pluralism actually be plural values One might mistakenly believe th' ofgoig o the party is irreducibly thavlu distinct from the value of staying home and thus be attracted by the allure of the former. One's reason for going to the party, while based on a false belief, could' nevertheless be a reason that makes one's weakness of wvill coherent. But perhaps for akrasia to be coherent in an .objective' sense, that is. coherent for agents with, U1n01. cilia. relevant beliefs that are true, plural values ar'e required. This version. however, also fails. One possible dlifficulty is that what grounds the akrates' attraction to the lesser option may be not the plurality of the values at stake but rather some' contingpent feature of the circumstances in which the value of the lesser option is instantiated or realized. So. for example. althoughi there might ultimately be only pleasure at' stake. the fact that the lesser Pleasure o"r going to the party, occurs in a seedy part ol'town has a special allure for' the akrates. There are arguably no plural \ alues here, only circumstances extrinsic to' the super\ alue whose special appeal to' the agent might pro%ide a reason for choosing the lesser option. A more significant problem is the fact that attraction to the lesser option canl be explained by appeal to different qualities or aspects of the supervalue, Take. for example. a choice betwveen two glasses of wine. one laced with pepper and one not (Stocker 1990). Although one judges that the unadulterated wine wvill provide the greater pleasure. one is charmed by the particular pleasure of the wvine laced with pepper n so chooses the lesser pleasure for the reason given b\ its particular charm. Similarly. one might choose, to go to the party while judging that staying hiomec is better for the reason thiat the party olption provides a particular quality of the superv~alue wvhich staying ait home lacks The success of this reply depends onl anl account of the individuation of value's. Is what attracts about the lesser option a value distinct from the value of the greater option or some distinctive quality of anl ultimate supervalue? Unvoiabe 2.3 Lssthe ossthat 2.3 navidale In some choice situations. it seems that no matter which alternative one chooses, something valuable will be lost. If. for example, one must choose between attending a lecture on Kant's ethics and having cheesecake with friends, one is bound to lose out on value no matter which alternative one chooses-and not simply because one cannot have both. If one chooses to attend' the lecture, one will forgo the glustatory pleasure of eating cheesecake: if one chooses to gio out for cheesecae, one will' forgo the philosophbical insight one would have gained at the lecture. The fact that any choice in such situations entails value loss shows that the choice involves atconflict betwveen 16142
is located in distinct values. Therefore. there. are plural values, valut in put sometimes is argument (Essentially the same pleasure-for-i terms of the possibility of rational regret overhvn that if it is foregone a lesser good.) betWeen twot exist, cases such that deny must seems. it MIonism, those consid& ere true, then choice would always be For if monism N% Thus, there i a matter of choosing more or less of a single value. if' are properly no is there value, more one chooses the option with Monism, i I value loss, If one chooses the option with the lesser accou correct unavoidable. not is butit value then there isvalue loss. a tenable noti Both the' argument from akraqa in its *objective' to undermin form and the argument from' unax oidable loss rely on accountfo incomipatible sometimes are values that conviction the choices thats with one another: pursuit of (respect for, instantiation is such a noti of. etc.) one excludes pursuit of (etc.) the other. It is the day. But any akrates' the grounds that incompatibility of values For if monisn attraction to thie lesser option and that ensures that no among valut value be will there chooses one matter which value attractions loss. This incomrpatibilit of %alues might be consimplicity it value of true was .believed ceptuaL' ats Isaiah Berlin the end, then concepts like juSrice and inu'rev. or an intrinsic feature monist value arise, they which in circumstances the of v-alues given If va-lunes are incompatible. it seems that they cannot be reduiced to a common value. The monisi reply here is already familiar fromt the 3. lInipucai pre%ious two argumlents Sophistcicted monkist of the M illion variety might insist that there can' be incomnAssuming thl. paiibilities ainong differenit qua/ides. or aspects of a if anything. single \aluc. In casesý of unavoidable loss, there need implications languorous The alue. \ ultimate one not be more than First, ifI pleasure of basking in the sunl might be incompatible vai reductive good unexpected hecaring~ of pleasure with the piquant it must be nex\ s-having the one pleasure no\\-rules out ha\ in-,the utilitarianisn other now\ lothouh they- are neverthecless instances of a the resultt singlle value. pleasuie (cf. Stocker 19901. Similarly, the generally. d, insight philosophical achievingL of qualitative value go. (This is ma\ be incompatible with the qualitative \ahue of of what it the between Choosing cheesecake. eating delicious rejected. On. lecture and the cheesecake invol; es a loss in value no some or oth. ultimate one only is there but chooses. matter how one all values re value, Many econo crucially pluralism value for arguments All three satisfaction depend onl the answer to the question, Ho\N are values the very leas behin~d idea fundamental The individuated? properly 1 true. Econo common monist response to pluralist arguments is isfaction of there is a nonultinaite sense of 'value' ac~cordling tf any claim tI which it can be true that there are distinct 'values' and One's prefer sense robust the in values be cannot values those yet rationality implied by the claim that thereare two distinct ultimate cnomn values. Philosophei Exactly ho"%this is to be worked out remains to be the only val is pleasure one that suggested has (1996) Hurka seen. £0bes is if pleasure not a different ultimate value from another either the cI In features. 'intrinsic' its of any in differ not it does is or the cht a'0 to intrinsic be explaining what it is for a feature to desire-satisl. is value a of location the that urges Hurka value. Some ha\ exytrinsic to it. Thus. John's pleasure and Joanna~'s any form o pleasure aire two instances ofthe same value. pleasilr. essential to Stocker (1990). however. has suggested'that if pleasuil iultimate
Value Plnralivi is located in different people. there are different ultimate ',alues: there is the pleasure-for-John and' the pieasure-for-Jotinnit. Stocker (1990. 1997) maintains that if it is rational to care about any difference it; o evaluative considerations, it follows that those considerations are different ultimate values. Thus. there is sharp disagreement about howv values are properi' individuated. monism. if it is to be plausible, must hold that the correct account of value individuation leaves room for a tenable notion of avalue quadlity or aspcctthat serves to undermine intuitions that values are plural. accounts for wveakness of will, and explains away chioicesthat seemn to invol'e unavoidable loss. If there is such a,notion, then value nmonism mnay yet wvin thle day But any such victory for nmonism may be hollow, Fortfnimonism is to be cluttered wvith complex relations tamong. \alue qualities or aspect~s. thle t\%o chief attractions of moniani fin short, the tidiness and simplicity it seemned ito olver--fall by the ;;ayside. Ini ihe end. thien. the debatie bet"e Nci a~luci pltira~lists and value mnoflisi' may be imiuch ado abhouit nothing,.
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Assuniii- thatithet e re uilthimate]y many\ \8 ties. \%,]III. if anythiing' of' interest i'ollov\ s? There are txoa main implications that are thought' to be important, First. if' red ucti'. c \1ti~e plutintlismi is true, then reductive t .due mon111is and any theory that relies onl it must be rc~iected. So. for examiple. Benithamnite utilitarianism has to go. Perhaps mote stgmificaint is the result that prelerence utilitarianism, or. niore generally. desit c-satisfaction theories o1' value mustM of go. (Thisl i not ito sa\ that deiiest sac onthotics he of whlat' it I's kit something, to /ewavalue tinut be no rejected. One night hold tha t ctvcry va Iic Iniut sat 1sf' ate some or other desire to be aItaluc a.;hle deniving tha~t all values redtuce to the t altic of' desire satisfactlonl.) ily Many economnists and somec philosophers favor desireules satisfaction accounts of value. and their accounts at ad the very least requir-e miodificaitioni jifvaltic pluralism is sis true. Ecironomists wh,]o mlodel rational choice' onl sat'to isfaction of pi eferences. for example, must relinqtuish nrd any claiml that goouI(kl' is atmatter of sattisfaction of Ie one's preferences and instead maintain only that the ate rationality of choice depends onl one's preferences Conforming to certain axioms (cf. Broome 1991). be Philosophers "h-]o think that individual well-being is is theol value there is and that what makes one's life e if go best is satisfaction of one's desires must give up In either the claim that wvell-beinit is the only value there oa is or the claini, that wvell-being- is simply a matter of -is desire-satisfrtctioii a's Some hate thought that value pluralism shows that ire. any form, of utilitarianism is mistaken. But what is tire essential to utilitarianism is compatible wvith value '
pluralism (Senl 1981). Others have thought that value pluralism is the foundation of political liberalism: if values are metaphysically plural. then liberalism is the correct theory of justice. But the metaphysical plurality of values is plausibly neutral between liberalism and nonliberalism. The faict that there are ultimately many values does not entail that a state should not compel its citizens to pursue one value over others, nor does monism entail that a state should not protect its citizens' choices to pursue nonultimate values in ways that do not best promote or respect the supervalue. As some political theorists have pointed' out, liberalism itself might be understood as monistic about value' the ultimate value is the value of permitting people to pursue different nonultimate values. Whether there is. in the end, somec indirect way in which value pluralism supports liberalism remains an open question. Value pluralism has been thought to have a second implication. If value pluralism is correct, then difficulties supposedly follow for rational choice. The difficulties alleged are various, but the reason for thinking- that none follows from value pluralism is the samne. Many have supposed, for example. that alterpaiubc'. How can the option of respecting someone's right to free speech be compared '; ith an option that doubles everyone's pleasure? Insofar as the value of a right to free speech is irreducibly distinct -from thle vailue of pleasure. it seems that there is no common basis onl which to make aIcomparison between their bearci s The argument goes. if options for choice bearing plural' values are incomparable. rational choice betwveen them is precluded. There is good reason, however, to think that the plurality of vatlues does not entail the incomparability of options that bear theni. Take any two putatively ultimiate v-alues stich as tilie value of .the right to free speech' and the value of pleasure. One can alway's imiaginte so nie option that bears the one value in a notable way\ that canl be compared with another option that bears the other v'alue in a nominal way. So. for instance, anl option that involves violating everyone's right to free speech is worse than anl option that inivolves reducing one person's pleasure by a small amount. Given any' two ptitatively irreducibly distinct values, there will always be some comparisoný between a notable bearer of thle one value with a nominal bearer of the other value. The existence of 'nominalnotable' comparisons demonstrates that if alternatives are incomparable. it is not the plurality of valuesper se that entails their incomparability (Chang 1997). Assuniing that rational choice depends on the comparability of alternatives, the plurality of values, then. does not preclude rational choice in this way. Although value pluralism does not entail incomparability, perhaps the issue of value pluralism is important because if value monism is true, complete comparability followvs. If there is ultimately only one value, evaluative differences bettween items must al16 143
Vl/ue's. Antliropotlogl Of and incomnmensurate goods. Anderson E 199- Practical~reason and 1n Chang R led I Jh~ounimicqisirdhillts. I,,ewM)v,,ithltll MA PttdReu.n,ei Harvard Uni~ersity Press,. Cambridge, 195 Come pz' and C'awgorte, Oxford Urnuersity' Press, Ierin oxford CRK Berlin 11959 The Cinok-ed Tunbe, of Humnallit Random House. uahnty U ncerwbirt na m a.it' ewior19 Iegig oos Nr~ 11 . MA CaghnibiGodse. Blac91 B.,M roducio. In: Chan R (ed.) hirmiln eattvilawl R 197In 13.ihang PractIa Reasont. Harvard UniCang' Ry1997intproducttio. Ind versi.lc),IPlresCambidge. MandPal a andld J 1986 iIelI.&B'g ie -%I ig.Aewu~ctt Giriffin Pu1pa' wine Clarendon Press. O.%rord. UK In: 1 199- Incon'arinsurabilitv What's the Problem? Gr~ifini n abilhlt . bucon, 1 ,ardhuit. and Prao' Chang R(ed, InII,cwintelmml Harn ard L.ranersiis Press. Cambridge. MA
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in a husense that the topic should be grounded manistic tradition. Both authors trace philosophical underpinnings while also discussing issues still current such as the debate between cultural, relativism and human rights. While the present essay is much briefer than the two noted. they serve as a baseline against which we can note new developments. Values, in the sense ol'conceptiOns of the desirable.' (KluckhohtI 1951) definitions of the good. the moral. enter anthropology both as an object of study and as an aspect of the anthropologist's own experience. Treating values as the object of stud%. anthropologists
Hark, TF199l6 \Ioni~in. plurali~nm. and rational regret Ellac 106: 555..75 / P/u.1,livin Princeton Universit Keks J 193, Tb, %mhle o/t I 1 Pess.1rneol 'F199i/wad Qu. Prgess
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The importance of values in anthropology, was recognlized by the mic-twventieth century by the designation Of two chapters on this topic in Alfred Kroeber's Today:- Ali Encl-clopedkc hwventory AflIhropologvii were vwritien by philosophers, chapters Both (1952). Bidiiey. rather than F. S. C. Northrop' and David practicing anthropologists. which perhaps' Suggests at
have taken either a cultural or a sociological approach.
inl themeither emphasizing the patterning of values selves, and the power of values as cultural conceptions wihsaeeprec
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valuestv emphawhzich shae inexperaiencehoip ,netat n h iigteitreainhiiewe'vle context. sociological Examples of thle first approach conie largely from culttiral anthropoloin in the American tradition (which' has phlilosophifcal roots in Germ an idealism )I Early examples are based onl configtrationatlisrill that is. holistic analysis of %alues wh-Inch definec broad Patthemes of atparticular culture. Benedict (1934). CII/nat,I is the classic example. She dis' 0/ehn 1(o11 I'ft
Appolonilal and Dnsia values amiong tingT, Plains compared with pueblo In ndiaa.Later. during and following W orld W ar 11. Benedict. M ead and' others applied thle samne a pp roaclh to whiole niatlions. depictingt dominant val ues and Ps> chological pattel ns, or J apan. Germanin aid Russia: thuts was created the imtional-cliuiacter school ill iit1iop1log\. Recog-
sweepilig holismn nizingi thle soniewhat undisciplined. f thlese anthIiropol ogicalI studies. K luck Iiohni. \'o gi (K..mcand Al bert (1I966). K luck Iiohn anad St rod beck refined 15.Klchh and Strodbecl, 1961) aI s defininia exlicit lu ci n ao e:\appo ach95. approach.
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dimensions For comnpa risoi (10 'l C wiiiple. past v.fture orientation iii relation to time or dominant'N s. submissive attitudes toward nature) aind mnade svst.eniatic comparisons of' particular ethnic or regional groups within America. Clifford Geertz adopted a larsonsiaii definition of culture (values, symbols. and that further refitned the older configurationialistic notion. then purstied at Weberiati project in his ~Re'ligion tJa'(19W0) w\here lie distinguished the major divisions withini a complex ctilture according to v'alues. Flahlfi. of ile Hear! (Bellah 1985) producing an applied this approachl to' America. influential critique of American Individualism and
calling for a return to earlier values that recognized
societal responsibility. As wvith the early configurationalists. German influences remained important in these later. Weberian-inspired w~orks: the Ieitinonjf is that values, as a manifestation of culture, have meaning and significance not reducible to any societal context. The second approach gives mote inmportaiice to thle societal context. which i~sviewved ats atcrucial sotlitce
